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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research was to evaluate whether a shipper's fuel surcharge (FSC) program affected
its per-load transportation costs in the United States full-truckload (TL) transportation industry. In this
study, we restricted transportation costs to line-haul charges and fuel surcharge premiums. Using ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression, we examined the effect of a shipper's FSC program on its line-haul
charges. We controlled for well-established transportation cost drivers, including distance and geography.
We found that carriers discounted their line-haul rates according to a shipper's FSC program. The more a
shipper paid in FSC premiums, the less it paid in line-haul charges. For fuel prices above $2.08 per
gallon, however, the fuel surcharge premiums dwarfed the line-haul discount. This effect was most
pronounced for shippers with low efficiency values. Shippers with lower efficiency values paid higher
per-load transportation costs than shippers with higher efficiency values.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Chris Caplice
Title: Executive Director, Center for Transportation and Logistics
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1 Introduction
Trucking is the dominant transportation mode in the United States. In 2009, trucking accounted for 68
percent of total U.S. freight tonnage and 82 percent of total U.S. freight spend. Interestingly, trucking
serves as the sole delivery source for over 80 percent of American communities (American Trucking
Associations, 2011).
1.1 Industry basics
There are three main players in the trucking industry: shippers, carriers, and third party logistics (3PL)
firms. Shippers have product which needs to be transported from an origin to a destination; carriers have
equipment, such as trucks and trailers, capable of performing this transportation. Some shippers prefer to
outsource their transportation management to a 3PL. In these cases, the 3PLs assume the role of the
shipper in shipper-carrier interactions.
Depending on factors such as the volume and weight of the product being moved, the shipper will rent all
or part of the carrier's trailer. The first case is called full-truckload (TL) transportation, and the second
case is called less-than truckload (LTL) transportation. The TL and LTL industries differ substantially in
size, number of competing carriers, and contract terms. The TL industry is exponentially larger than the
LTL industry. In fact, the TL industry has 45,000 carriers and makes up 80 percent of U.S. transportation
spend. By comparison, the LTL industry has only 150 carriers (Standard & Poors, 2012). In our research,
we considered only the TL transportation industry.
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1.2 Transportation costs
The shipper pays the carrier a fee for moving its product. This fee has three components: a line-haul
charge, an accessorial charge, and a fuel surcharge (FSC).
Total transportation cost = line-haul + accessorials + FSC (1)
The line-haul charge equals the carrier-set rate per distance multiplied by the distance. Most often, the
line-haul charge is reported in terms of a rate per mile (RPM).
Line-haul = carrier rate per distance x distance (2)
In most cases, the line-haul charge is the most substantial portion of total transportation cost. The
accessorial charge is an optional fee for extra services performed by the carrier, for instance extra driver
wait time. Finally, the fuel surcharge is a premium to compensate carriers for fuel expenditures. We
explain how FSCs are calculated in detail in the next section. We ignored accessorial charges in this
research, and consequently our revised total transportation cost equaled:
Total transportation cost = line-haul + FSC (3)
1.3 Calculating fuel surcharge
In a perfect world, carrier rate per mile would cover the carrier's operating costs, including fuel, and a
markup for profit. Unfortunately, this situation is impossible since fuel prices are volatile. From 2008 to
2011, diesel fuel prices ranged from $2.02 per gallon to $4.76 per gallon. The median fuel price was
approximately $3.12 per gallon. A carrier cannot know what the price of fuel will be when it finally
moves the shipper's product. In most cases, the carrier sets a contracted long-haul rate for the entire year.
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While the line-haul charge is set by the carrier ahead of time during contracting, the fuel surcharge is
determined by the shipper based on the prevailing fuel price at the time of the actual shipment. Once the
shipment is complete, the shipper pays the carrier for all charges. How the cost of fuel is shared between
the shipper and the carrier depends on the shipper's own fuel surcharge program and the prevailing price
of fuel.
Figure 1 illustrates how fuel prices varied from 2008 to 2011. The figure also shows how line-haul and
total cost rates moved with fuel prices over this period. Fuel costs represent about 30 percent of a carrier's
total operating cost (American Transportation Research Institute, 2011). In general, in order to secure
carrier capacity when fuel prices rise, a shipper must pay its carrier higher rates to compensate for higher
fuel costs.
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Figure 1. Volatility of fuel prices and transportation rates
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1.3.1 A typical fuel surcharge program
Shippers report their FSC programs to carriers in a table outlining how much the shipper will pay at
different fuel prices. A shipper's FSC program table is defined by three important values: the peg price,
the premium, and the escalator. Table 1 gives an example FSC table.
Table 1. Example FSC program table
Fuel price between Premium
$1.020 / gallon $1.079 / gallon $(0.030) / mile
1.080 1.139 (0.020)
1.140 1.199 (0.010)
1.200 1.259 0.000
1.260 1.319 0.010
1.320 1.379 0.020
3.600 3.659 0.400
3.660 3.719 0.410
The peg price is the threshold fuel price above which the shipper pays the carrier a fuel surcharge
premium. In this example, the peg price of $1.20 per gallon. When the price of fuel is below the peg
price, the shipper pays the carrier a negative premium by discounting the total rate. Most FSC programs
were set by shippers decades ago when fuel prices were low and have since been left unchanged. It is
quite unusual for the price of fuel to be less than the peg price, and so although negative surcharges exist
in almost all FSC programs, they are rarely triggered (Heartson, 2012).
The premium is the per mile amount paid by the shipper to the carrier for fuel. The escalator is the
difference between two consecutive fuel prices in the FSC program table. The escalator determines the
rates at which the premium increases with the price of fuel. The efficiency variable is a manipulation of
12
this escalator term and represents the shipper's estimate of an equitable carrier equipment fuel economy
in miles per gallon.
escalator
Efficiency A emiumA premium
gallon miles
$ gallon
mile
From the first row, we see that the escalator value is $1.080 - $1.020 = $0.06 per gallon. We calculate the
efficiency value using the efficiency equation:
1.260 - 1.200
Efficiency = 0.010 - 0.000
0.060 -$gallon
0.010 $
miles
Suppose the prevailing price of fuel is $3.60 per gallon. In this case, the shipper will pay the carrier $0.40
per mile for fuel. For a 300 mile route, the shipper will pay the carrier a $120 fuel surcharge. Most
shippers determine the prevailing fuel price by referencing the U.S. Department of Energy weekly
average national price of #2 diesel (EIA, 2012).
Each shipper sets its own peg, premium, and escalator value to create its FSC program.
13
(4)
miles
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1.3.2 Modeling an FSC program
An FSC program table, like the one shown above, provides the premium paid by the shipper at every fuel
price. FSC program tables are discontinuous, because they allow for only a finite number of premium
values. We can represent this table by using an integer function to create the following step equations:
Per-mile FSC premium = INT fuel price-peg 0.01[ escalator 0
[ fuel price -peg]Total FSC premium = INT eltr X
Iescalator
0.01 x distance
(5)
(6)
For simplicity, we can approximate these step equations with the continuous linear equations given
below.
. fuelprice -- pegPer-mile FSC premium = efficencype
eff iciency)
( fuel price - pegs
Total FSC premium = fefice - x distance
eff iciency
(7)
(8)
Consider the case where fuel price equals $3.60 per gallon and the lane is 300 miles. Using the above
equation to calculate FSC premium, we get:
Total FSC premium =
(1.26 - 1.20) $
6 milesgallon x 300 miles 
= $120
gallon
In this case, the discontinuous and continuous equations yield the same FSC premium.
14
(9)
Figure 2 shows the difference between the step and continuous equations.
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Figure 2. Modeling an FSC program
The step function and can only take on whole cent premiums, while the continuous linear function can
take on all real premiums.
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1.3.3 Comparing shipper FSC programs
Together, the peg and efficiency determine a shipper's fuel surcharge premiums. To show the effect of
different peg and efficiency values on per-mile FSC premiums, we give three hypothetical FSC programs
in Table 2.
Table 2. Comparing shipper FSC programs
Shipper Peg ($ / gallon) Efficiency (miles per gallon)
A 0.90 7
B 1.15 6
C 2.15 5
Figure 3 shows the shippers' FSC premiums at different fuel prices. Each line represents a different
shipper's FSC payouts. The x-intercept represents the peg. The slope equals the rate at which FSC
premium changes for a one unit increase in fuel price and represents the reciprocal of the efficiency value.
E
L
C-)
LA.
$0.80
$0.60
$0.40
$0.20
$0.00
-$0.20
-$0.40
-$0.60
4I
02.00 $3.00 $4.00 $5.00
Fuel price ($ / gallon)
- Shipper A - Shipper B - Shipper C
Figure 3. Comparing shipper FSC programs
Shipper A and Shipper B pay carriers the same fuel surcharge premium when the price of fuel is $2.60 per
gallon. For fuel prices above $2.60 per gallon, Shipper B pays carriers a higher fuel surcharge premium
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than does Shipper A. The reverse is true for fuel prices below $2.60 per gallon. Shipper C pays carriers
the lowest fuel surcharge premium for all fuel prices.
1.3.4 Impact of efficiency
In the fuel surcharge equation, efficiency represents the shipper's estimate of a fair carrier fuel economy.
In almost every case, the shipper's estimate differs from the carrier's true efficiency. In fact, a carrier's
true efficiency varies with traffic congestion, the lane, and the time of year, among other factors.
Consider an example, illustrated in Figure 4, with one shipper and two carriers. One carrier has a
relatively efficient mileage of seven miles per gallon, and the other carrier has a relatively inefficient
mileage of five miles per gallon. The shipper assumes a carrier efficiency of six miles per gallon and has a
peg value of $0.90 per gallon.
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Figure 4. Understanding the effect of efficiencies
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The graph shows how much the shipper pays in FSC premiums at each fuel price. It also shows each
carrier's fuel cost, in dollars per mile. Fuel cost is calculated by dividing the prevailing fuel price by the
carrier's true efficiency. Though the shipper's FSC premium is less than the carrier's fuel cost at all fuel
prices due to the shipper's peg price, the efficient carrier is comparatively better off than the inefficient
carrier because it is able to recover a larger portion of its fuel cost. For example, when the price of fuel is
$2.00 per gallon, the efficient carrier recovers about 70 percent of its fuel cost from the FSC premium,
while the inefficient carrier recovers only 50 percent of its fuel cost. When the price of fuel is $5.00 per
gallon, the efficient carrier recovers 100 percent of its fuel cost from the FSC premium, while the
inefficient carrier recovers only 70 percent of its fuel cost. This graph does not consider the fuel costs
associated with a carrier's return trip from the shipper's destination, called a backhaul, which is not paid
for by the shipper.
Assuming a constant peg price and price of fuel, the lower a shipper sets its efficiency, the more it pays to
carriers in fuel surcharge premiums. Because carriers do not want shippers to raise their FSC program
efficiencies, carriers with high efficiencies do not freely distribute their efficiency information to shippers
(Kanteti, Levine, 2011).
1.4 Two key transportation processes: procurement and tendering
Recall that shippers hire carriers to move product. To facilitate the hiring process, shippers identify a
group of preferred carriers in advance of need, and rank them in order of preference. This activity is
called procurement, and it typically occurs every year or every other year. Later, when the shipper needs
to move a load, the shipper offers the load to its preferred carriers. This process is called tendering, and it
can happen several times a week. We explain procurement and tendering in more detail below.
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1.4.1 Procuring carriers
The process of identifying and ranking carriers is called procurement or bidding exercise. The exercise
has three steps: shipper RFP distribution, carrier bid submission, and shipper selection.
(1) Shipper RFP distribution. In the first step, the shipper distributes a request for proposal (RFP) to
preselected carriers. Hundreds of carriers can be included in this process. The RFP contains several
pieces of information, including the FSC program information, lane information, and sometimes the
anticipated volume for each lane.
(2) Carrier bid submission. The carrier responds to the shipper's RFP by submitting a bid for each lane.
(3) Shipper selection. In the final step, the shipper selects its primary and backup carriers for each lane.
This ranking of carriers for each lane is the shipper's routing guide. Shippers rank carriers primarily
on cost, on-time delivery performance, and tender acceptance rate.
1.4.2 Tendering a load
Under normal circumstances, when the shipper needs to move a load, it offers the load to carriers on its
routing guide, starting with the primary carrier. This process is called tendering a load. The primary
carrier can either accept or reject the load. If the carrier rejects the load, the shipper offers the load to the
first backup carrier on the routing guide. This process repeats until a carrier accepts the load. Sometimes
no routing guide carrier accepts the load. In such cases, the shipper offers the load on the spot market and
the total transportation cost is negotiated in real time.
The term "bid depth" is defined as the number of times a shipper tenders a load before the load is
accepted by a carrier. The term "tender lead time" refers to the amount of time between when a shipper
tenders the load and when the carrier transports the load. For most firms, the tender process is automated
through a transportation management system (TMS).
19
In the TL industry, shipper-carrier contracts are binding with respect to rates but non-binding with respect
to volume. This means that while a carrier can refuse a shipper's load during tendering, if the carrier
accepts the shipper's load, it must charge the contracted line-haul rate established during procurement.
Carriers avoid rejecting too many tenders, however, because a shipper will stop using a carrier if the
carrier's rejection rate becomes too high.
1.5 Our research question
Shippers have different fuel surcharge programs. Consequently, at a given fuel price, some shippers pay
higher FSC premiums than others. We wanted to know if higher fuel surcharge premiums translated into
higher total transportation costs for shippers. We hypothesized that carriers would offset higher shipper
fuel surcharge premiums by offering lower line-haul rates. We tested our hypothesis through a cost model
which evaluated how a shipper's FSC program affected its total cost.
1.6 Partner company
To conduct our research, we partnered with C.H. Robinson Worldwide, a 3PL serving clients in freight
transportation, logistics, and outsourcing. Our dataset came from C.H. Robinson's Transportation
Management Center (TMC), a division which provides outsourced transportation management. Our
dataset contained single-mode freight transportation records from 17 shippers and 1,458 carriers in the
United States over the years 2008 to 2012.
1.7 Chapter summary
This chapter introduced the truckload transportation industry, its players, and its primary costs. It also
introduced the concept of a fuel surcharge program and described how it is used by shippers and carriers
to split fuel price risk.
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1.8 Looking ahead
The next chapter summarizes previous research on both the use of fuel surcharge programs and the use of
quantitative models for predicting transportation costs. The third chapter profiles our dataset and looks for
meaningful trends and patterns in the data. The fourth chapter describes how we analyzed our data and
what conclusions we were able to draw from our analysis. The final chapter discusses the implications of
our results for the TL transportation industry. It also suggests topics for further research.
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2 Literature review
The purpose of this literature review is twofold: (1) to better understand how fuel surcharge programs are
used in the TL transportation industry, and (2) to explore how past researchers have modeled
transportation costs.
2.1 FSC programs in the TL transportation industry
The shipper compensates the carrier for fuel expenditures according to the shipper's fuel surcharge
program. Both the shipper and the carrier prefer to calculate fuel costs separately from all other charges.
By calculating fuel independently, the shipper can more easily track and manage those transportation
costs that are under its control, such as line-haul charges. Likewise, the carrier can more easily set long-
term rates without having to account for volatile fuel prices.
In the TL transportation industry, shipper-set FSC programs vary significantly. In general, efficiency
values range from five to seven miles per gallon. Peg values range from $1.00 to $1.50 per gallon. Most
peg values were set decades ago when fuel prices were stable between $1.00 and $2.00. Transportation
managers at C.H. Robinson believe shippers have left pegs unchanged because (1) no shipper wants to
move first in setting a new peg value, and (2) shippers are unsure how carriers will respond to updated
peg values. CHR reasons that a shipper would feel comfortable updating its peg value if a large group of
shippers acted simultaneously (Raetz, 2008).
In their previous research, Kanteti and Levine (2011) surveyed carriers to determine how they would
respond to updated shipper FSC programs. Of the surveyed carriers, 52 percent believed that they could
seamlessly adjust their rates to a new FSC peg price, without affecting revenues. Another 30 percent of
carriers felt that a new FSC program would cause only administrative challenges (Kanteti, Levine, 2011).
Importantly, the surveyed carriers believed that shipper-set FSC programs did not affect carrier revenues -
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and by extension - shipper cost. Our research quantitatively tests the claim that a shipper's FSC program
does not affect its total transportation cost.
2.2 Modeling transportation costs
There has been much research done on the drivers of total transportation cost in the TL transportation
industry. We can split these cost drivers into two categories: core and non-core. Core cost drivers explain
a large portion of the total cost, while non-core drivers explain only a marginal portion of total cost.
Well-established, core cost drivers include geographic factors, such as load origin and destination, and
distance. Non-core cost drivers include carrier size, tender lead time, tender day of week, and
procurement exercise frequency. In determining how a shipper's fuel surcharge program affects its
transportation cost, we had to account for core and - whenever possible - non-core drivers. We discuss
these cost drivers in more detail below.
2.2.1 Core cost drivers
Core cost drivers include load origin and destination and distance. Together, load origin and destination
form a lane. Carriers consider some lanes more attractive than others; they offer shippers lower rates for
more attractive lanes (Caplice, Sheffi, 2006). In general, carriers consider high-volume lanes to be more
attractive than low-volume lanes. It is very expensive for carriers to perform a backhaul with an empty
truck. Carriers prefer to secure a new load for their backhaul trip, and they have a better chance of doing
so on a high-volume lane. In addition to lane volume, carriers may simply prefer to operate in certain
states.
Distance, in miles, is also an important cost driver. Among other things, distance dictates how long it will
take a carrier to perform the shipment, how many drivers are required, how much wear-and-tear the truck
will incur, and how much fuel will be needed.
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2.2.2 Non-core cost drivers
Non-core cost drivers include carrier rank, carrier size, tender lead time, tender day of week, and
procurement event frequency. Carrier rank refers to the carrier's position in the shipper's routing guide.
Most shippers assign low-cost carriers to the top of their guides. Consequently, as carrier rank increases,
rates tend to rise.
Carrier size refers to the number of trucks a carrier has. Caldwell and Fisher (2008) found that rates
increase with carrier size. Larger carriers had higher rates. The researchers reasoned that large carriers
have higher overhead expenses but no cost savings at the individual truck level. Caldwell and Fisher also
hypothesized that larger carriers might have higher rates because they tend to serve more remote parts of
the country (Caldwell and Fisher, 2008).
Caldwell and Fisher also showed that tender lead time - or the difference between tender date and ship
date - negatively affects total cost. Loads with longer lead times tend to have lower rates. This trend
makes sense as carriers naturally prefer to have more advance notice before transporting a load. If a
shipper waits until the last minute to hire a carrier, it is likely that many low-cost carriers will already be
booked. Indeed, Caldwell and Fisher found that carrier acceptance rate increased for loads with longer
tender lead times. An industry paper, based on Caldwell and Fisher's work, stressed the importance of
tender lead time (C.H. Robinson, 2008):
Increasing lead time from less than two days to over three days would improve the carrier
acceptance rate and save an average of $15.34 per load. While this might seem a modest savings,
if applied to a shipper's 40,000 loads per year, the shipper would save $613,000 on their annual
transportation costs.
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The day of the week that a load is shipped also affects total cost. Most organizations are structured around
a Monday through Friday work week. Consequently, rates tend to be higher for loads that are tendered or
shipped during the weekends (Caldwell and Fisher, 2008). It is important to note that Caldwell and Fisher
also used TMC data, but from earlier years.
Recall that most shippers engage in procurement exercises every year or every other year. During a
procurement exercise, a shipper requests bids from preselected carriers and creates its routing guide. We
say a shipper has 'stale rates' if they have not engaged in a recent procurement exercise. In their 2012
research, Martens and Suzuki showed that shippers that engage in frequent, semi-annual procurement
exercises enjoy lower rates than shippers that engage in infrequent annual procurement exercises
(Martens and Suzuki, 2012).
2.3 Chapter summary
This chapter emphasized the importance of FSC programs in TL transportation. It also laid the
groundwork, in terms of relevant cost drivers, for our quantitative cost model. We now turn to organizing
and analyzing our dataset.
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3 Profiling the dataset
Before we conducted our quantitative analysis, we cleaned and organized the dataset and looked for
meaningful patterns and trends in the data. We explain both of these processes in the subsequent sections.
3.1 Data preparation
In this research, we were interested in quantifying the impact of a shipper's FSC program on its TL
transportation costs. We eliminated records with overly-complicated rates, such as records from
refrigerated, multi-modal, or cross-border freight. We also eliminated short-haul records in which the
distance traveled was less than 300 miles. Short-hauls have highly variable and unpredictable
transportation costs; they are not in the scope of this research. Finally, we restricted our data to loads from
shippers for which we had fuel surcharge program information.
In addition to the above restrictions, we also eliminated flawed or highly unusual records because we
suspected them to be either data entry errors or outliers. Leaving these records in the dataset would
inaccurately skew our analysis. Specifically, we deleted records with (1) missing values for Line-haul or
Distance, (2) negative values for Total Rate, Line-haul, or Tender Lead Time, (3) a RPM less than $0.8
per mile or greater than $2.5 per mile, and (4) distances greater than 3,000 miles. In our dataset, most
RPMs fell between $1.2 per mile and $2.0 per mile. Records with RPMs below $0.8 per mile and above
$2.5 per mile were well outside this normal range. Records with reported distances greater than 3,000
miles were most likely the results of data entry errors.
Our last dataset modification was updating the Fuel Surcharge value for all records. Due to difficulties
procuring data, the TMC dataset had inconsistent or missing FSC values for many records. To correct this
problem, we recalculated the FSC value for each record by using the appropriate shipper's FSC program
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information and the prevailing fuel price at the time of shipment as reported by the U.S. Department of
Transportation for # 2 diesel.
After cleaning and organizing the data, we had records of over one million tenders and 600,000 loads
distributed across the continental United States. Together, the total dollar value of these 600,000 loads
was $826,321,347. Our dataset also contained information about 17 shippers in diverse industries and 698
carriers. This sizeable and evenly-distributed dataset was representative of the TL transportation industry.
3.2 Data characteristics
In the literature review, we discussed well-established behaviors in the trucking industry. By analyzing
our dataset, we were able to confirm many of these behaviors. For example, our data revealed that RPM
decreased with length of haul and tender lead time and increased with bid depth.
The first step in uncovering these insights was to summarize the data. The second step was to look for
trends in the data.
3.2.1 Data summary
3.2.1.1 Shipper profile
Our data contained records from 17 shippers, all with different FSC programs. Peg values ranged from
$0.90 to $1.90, well below prevailing fuel prices. Efficiency values ranged from 4.62 miles per gallon to
7.00 miles per gallon. Shipper 1 had an unusual efficiency value of 12.00 miles per gallon. Shipper 14,
with a significantly lower efficiency value of 4.62 miles per gallon, paid carriers the largest per-mile fuel
surcharge premium. For example, Shipper 14 offered carriers $0.39 per mile at a fuel price of $3.00 per
gallon and $0.60 per mile at a fuel price of $4.00 per gallon. Conversely, Shipper 1 paid carriers the
lowest per-mile premium, offering only $0.15 per mile at $3.00 per gallon and $0.24 per mile at $4.00 per
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gallon. Figure 5 shows how much each shipper paid in FSC premiums at different fuel prices. When the
price of fuel was $3.50 per gallon, the majority of shippers paid carriers between $0.30 and $0.45 per mile
for fuel.
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Figure 5. Distribution of shipper FSC programs
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The shippers also differed in terms of load count, average length of haul, and average line-haul RPM paid.
Shipper 7 was the largest shipper with over 57 percent of the loads, or 359,249 loads. Shippers 13, 2, and
5 were all very small, with only seven, nine, and 36 loads respectively. The average line-haul RPM paid
by each shipper ranged from $1.17 to $1.90 per mile.
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Table 3 summarizes shipper data.
Table 3. Summary of shipper data
General information FSC program inputs FSC per-mile premium
Shipper # Loads Avg miles Avg RPM Peg Efficiency @ $3/gal @ $4/gal
7 359,249 678 $1.63/mi $1.15/gal 6.00 mpg $0.31/gal $0.48/gal
10 81,183 631 1.55 1.18 5.88 0.31 0.48
9 67,648 714 1.48 1.33 5.00 0.33 0.53
15 41,237 693 1.45 1.26 6.00 0.29 0.46
17 33,939 663 1.50 1.25 6.00 0.29 0.46
11 17,824 777 1.54 1.20 5.00 0.36 0.56
4 14,718 553 1.47 1.31 5.00 0.34 0.54
16 6,211 1,045 1.30 0.90 7.00 0.30 0.44
1 4,818 926 1.34 1.15 12.00 0.15 0.24
12 4,480 1,047 1.50 1.31 6.00 0.28 0.45
3 972 771 1.17 1.15 5.00 0.37 0.57
14 391 1,496 1.34 1.21 4.62 0.39 0.60
8 168 517 1.67 1.33 5.00 0.33 0.53
6 163 1,364 1.29 1.20 5.00 0.36 0.56
5 36 1,100 1.42 1.87 5.00 0.23 0.43
2 9 805 1.31 1.68 6.00 0.22 0.39
13 7 525 1.90 1.25 5.00 0.35 0.55
Range 7 - 359,249 517 - 1,496 1.17 - 1.90 0.90 - 1.87 4.62 - 12.00 0.15-0.39 0.24-0.60
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3.2.1.2 Geographic distribution
Figure 6 shows how loads were distributed throughout the United States. We divided the continental U.S.
into six regions: Northwest, Southwest, North Central, South Central, Northeast, and Southeast. The
Northeast and Southeast had the greatest percentage of loads by far, accounting for 57 percent of load
origins and 52 percent of load destinations. The Northwest had the lowest percentage of loads, with only
3 percent of load origins and 4 percent of load destinations.
NE
SE
Figure 6. Geographic distribution of loads
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3.2.1.3 Tender profile
In analyzing our data, we looked at three characteristics of shipper tenders: (1) bid depth, (2) tender lead
time, and (3) tender and ship date distribution. Recall that bid depth refers to the number of times a
shipper tenders a load before the load is accepted by a carrier. Tender lead time quantifies how much
advance warning a carrier has before having to transport the shipper's goods. Tender date and ship date
refer to the day of the week that the load was tendered or shipped.
In our dataset, roughly 75 percent of loads were accepted by the first carrier in the routing guide. Almost
all loads were accepted by one of the first seven carriers in the guide. A few unusual loads had bid depths
of up to 50 tenders; however the average bid depth was 1.15 tenders per load. Figure 7 gives the bid depth
distribution for loads with more than one tender.
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Figure 7. Distribution of bid depth for loads with more than one tender
The graph shows that 13 percent of all loads were hauled by the first backup carrier in the shipper's
routing guide. Less than one percent of loads was hauled by a carrier ranked seventh or lower in the
guide.
31
Tender lead time ranged from less than one hour to more than several months. Approximately 67 percent
of tenders had lead times of three days or less. Less than one percent of tenders had lead times of more
than 14 days. Figure 8 gives the tender lead time distribution.
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Figure 8. Distribution of tender lead time
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As expected, most loads were tendered during the business week, with almost no loads being tendered on
the weekends. Similarly, most loads were shipped during the business week, with the greatest percentage
of shipped loads occurring on Friday. Almost seven percent of loads were shipped on Saturday. Figure 9
give the tender and ship day distribution.
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Figure 9. Distribution of tender and ship day of week
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3.2.2 Trends
By profiling our data, we were able to confirm several widely-held beliefs in the trucking industry.
Specifically, we confirmed that average line-haul RPM decreases with length of haul and tender lead time
and increases with bid depth. Our data also showed that shipper volume does not affect average line-haul
RPM paid.
In our dataset, average line-haul RPM decreased with length of haul with a correlation of -0.90. This
relationship makes logical sense. When a carrier transports a load, it incurs some fixed costs. As the
length of haul increases, the carrier can spread these fixed costs over more miles. As a result, carriers tend
to quote lower RPMs for longer hauls. Figure 10 shows the relationship between average line-haul RPM
and length of haul.
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Figure 10. Average line-haul RPM versus distance
Loads with a distance of 500 miles had an average line-haul RPM of $1.65 per mile, while loads with a
distance of 2,000 miles had a substantially lower RPM of $1.20 per mile.
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We also observed that average line-haul RPM increased with bid depth with a correlation of 0.89. When
shippers rank carriers in the guide, they tend to put low-cost carriers at the top of the guide, except in the
case where an inexpensive carrier has very limited capacity. Therefore, when a load is rejected, the
shipper must offer the load to a deeper, more expensive carrier in the routing guide. Therefore, it is
reasonable that average line-haul RPM increases with bid depth. Figure 11 shows the relationship
between average line-haul RPM and bid depth in blue and also gives the bid depth distribution from
Figure 7.
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Figure 11. Average line-haul RPM versus load bid depth
The graph shows that 76 percent of loads have a bid depth of one; the corresponding average line-haul
RPM for these loads is $1.53 per mile. Less than one percent of loads have a bid depth of 10; the
corresponding average line-haul RPM for these loads is 30 cents higher at $1.83 per mile.
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Our dataset showed that as tender lead time increases, trucking rates decrease. Consider a situation where
a shipper has a load that must be shipped on the following day. As usual, the shipper will tender the load
to carriers in its routing guide however, because of the last-minute nature of the tender, many routing
guide carriers will already be booked. Consequently, to move the load on time, the shipper will have to
hire a lower-ranked, more expensive carrier. In our data, shippers with shorter average lead times had
higher average line-haul RPMs, and vice versa. We verified this relationship in our regression analysis.
Figure 12 shows that shippers can lower their transportation costs by reserving capacity with their most
preferred carriers early. This graph ignores the confounding effect of length of haul on average RPM.
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Figure 12. Average tender lead time and average line-haul RPM by shipper
Finally, our dataset revealed that shippers of all sizes in the TL industry pay similar transportation rates.
This situation is very different from the situation in other industries, in which large players can command
lower prices on inputs. Figure 13 gives shipper size, in load count, versus the average line-haul RPM paid
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by each shipper. Interestingly, the graph shows no correlation between load count and average line-haul
RPM. For example, Shipper 1, the median shipper with respect to load count, had an average rate of $1.34
per mile, while Shipper 7, the largest shipper with respect to load count, had an average rate of $1.63 per
mile.
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3.3 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we described the steps that we took to generate our final dataset. We also discussed
correlations in the dataset, including (1) the negative correlation between average line-haul RPM and
distance, (2) the positive correlation between average line-haul RPM and load bid depth, (3) the negative
correlation between average line-haul RPM and tender lead time, and (4) the lack of correlation between
average line-haul RPM and shipper volume.
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4 Data analysis and results
This research explored whether a shipper's FSC program affects its total transportation cost. In this study,
we defined total transportation cost to be the sum of the line-haul charge and the fuel surcharge. We
hypothesized that a shipper which pays higher than average FSC premiums pays lower than average line-
haul charges.
4.1 Building the cost model
Using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis in SAS JMP Pro statistical software, we tested the
effect of a shipper's FSC program on its total transportation cost. In OLS regression, a series of
independent variables are used to predict the value of a dependent variable. Independent variables can be
either continuous or discrete. A continuous variable can assume any real value, while a discrete variable
can take on only a finite number of values. One special type of discrete variable is called a dummy
variable, which can assume a value of either zero or one. A value of one indicates the presence of some
categorical characteristic. To avoid model "over-specification", there should always be one less dummy
variable than category in the model. For example, suppose we wanted to include dummy variables for the
seasons. We would include a dummy variable for Fall, Winter, and Spring. The condition Summer would
exist when the three other dummy variables equaled zero.
The following example describes OLS regression in its simplest form.
y = 3x -2w + E (10)
In this basic example, the independent variables x and w predict the value of the dependent variable y.
Epsilon, E, is the error term, and it represents the difference between the actual and predicted value ofy.
The numbers in front of the independent variables are called coefficients. Coefficients indicate how the
independent variables affect the dependent variable. In this case, the positive coefficient on the x variable
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means that if the value of x increases by one unit, the value of y increases by three units. In OLS
regression, the coefficients are derived such that they minimize the sum of the squared error terms.
Other important regression concepts include the R2 term, the coefficient t-statistics, the coefficient p-
values, the mean squared error (MSE) term, the mean absolute percent error (MAPE) term, and the mean
percent error (MPE) term. The R2 term represents the proportion of variation in the dependent variable
that is explained by the independent variables. Because R2 is a proportion, its values range from zero to
one or zero percent to 100 percent. The higher the R2 term, the better the model is at predicting the value
of the dependent variable.
E(y, - 9)2 SSR
E(yi - Y) 2 SST
In this equation, SSR equals the sum of squared residuals or error terms, and SST equals the total sum of
squares. Together, SSR divided by SST equals the proportion of variation in the dependent variable that is
unexplained by the model. Consequently, one minus this proportion equals the proportion of variation in
the dependent variable that is explained by the model. The Adjusted R2 term is a modification of the R2
term which accounts for the number of independent variables in the model.
Along with coefficients, OLS regression generates t-statistics and p-values for each independent variable.
Both calculations measure the statistical significance of an independent variable. If an independent
variable is statistically significant, it indicates that the predictive power of the variable is unlikely to be
due to chance alone. Larger t-statistics and smaller p-values imply stronger statistical significance. In our
research, we considered an independent variable to be statistically significant if the p-value was less than
0.05. Under normal circumstances, insignificant variables should not be included in a regression equation.
That said, in a few cases we retained variables with insignificant p-values for model completeness. For
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example, we included variables for all 48 continental states, even though some state variables were
insignificant.
The mean squared error (MSE) and the mean absolute percent error (MAPE) both measure model
accuracy. MSE measures total model error and does not normalize the error terms for the size of the
observed values. The MAPE term, on the other hand, gives the average absolute error as a proportion of
the observed value. The mean percent error (MPE) measures the bias of the model. A MPE of zero means
the model is perfectly unbiased. A non-zero MPE, however, means that the model has either positive or
negative bias.
The following equations give the equations for MSE, MAPE, and MPE.
Mean squared error (MSE) = (12)
n
n jet
__t=1 
_ a(13)
Mean absolute percent error (MAPE) = t
n
En et
Mean percent error (MPE) = t=1 at (14)
n
Here, a, represents an observed value from the dataset, e, represents the error term of that value, or the
difference between the observed value and the value predicted by the model, and n represents the number
of observations in the dataset.
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4.2 Model variables
OLS determines how independent variables explain or affect a dependent variable. In our study, we
wanted to evaluate how a shipper's FSC program affected its line-haul cost. Therefore, we created a
dependent variable to represent a shipper's line-haul cost and an independent variable to represent a
shipper's FSC program. Figure 14 gives our dependent line-haul variable and our independent FSC
variable. We explain this breakdown next.
Total cost
Contracted FSC
Pure FSC
IND. VARIABLE
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Contracted line-
haul
Pure line-haul
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Figure 14. Dependent and independent variables
4.2.1 Dependent variable
When the price of fuel drops below a shipper's peg price, the shipper levies a negative fuel surcharge on
the carrier. Carriers take into account the likelihood of a negative fuel surcharge when setting their line-
haul rates. As a result, the line-haul charge has two components: (1) a pure line-haul component which is
independent of the peg price, and (2) an implicit fuel surcharge which accounts for the likelihood of a
negative fuel surcharge.
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Our goal was to determine if a shipper's FSC program affected its line-haul costs. Consequently, we had
to separate variables which depended on the shipper's FSC program from variables that did not. We set
our dependent variable equal to pure line-haul (PLH).
We calculated pure line-haul, which is measured in dollars per load, as follows:
Pure line-haul = quoted line-haul - pe x distance (15)
eff iciency
$ gallon $
haul miles haul
gallon
4.2.2 Independent variables
Our cost model contained an independent variable to measure a shipper's FSC program. It also contained
independent variables for other transportation cost drivers.
4.2.2.1 Fuel surcharge variable
We set our independent FSC variable, called pure FSC (PFSC), equal to the implicit fuel surcharge plus
the actual FSC paid. We calculated pure FSC, which is measured in dollars, as follows:
Pure FSC = FSC paid + implicit FSC (16)
[(assumed fuel price - peg + 
peg
efficiency / \efficiency
(assumed fuel price x distefficiency
gallon
mie x miles =$
miles
gallon
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Pure FSC measures the total fuel surcharge paid by the shipper to the carrier and is dependent on the
prevailing price of fuel. However, when the carrier submits its line-haul rates to the shipper during
bidding, the carrier does not know what the price of fuel will be in the coming period. Instead, the carrier
must submit its rate based on its expectation of future fuel prices. In our study, we assumed a fuel price
expectation of $3.30 per gallon, which was the mean price of fuel between 2008 and 2011. Later, we
show that our results did not change when we tested our model with different assumed fuel prices.
4.2.2.2 Other independent variables
In the literature review, we discussed drivers of transportation cost. We incorporated these drivers in our
cost model. As in the literature review, we split the independent variables into two groups: core and non-
core variables. Core variables had substantial power in explaining the total cost, while non-core variables
had only marginal explanatory power. Core variables included the lane geography and the distance
traveled. In our study, we also considered the time of year, expressed in quarters, to be a core variable in
order to capture seasonality and macroeconomic effects in the TL industry. Non-core variables included
carrier rank, carrier size, tender lead time, tender day of week, and procurement exercise frequency. Of
these, we did not consider carrier size and procurement exercise frequency in our model, however, due to
insufficient data. We describe how we modeled each variable below.
Core variables:
(1) Geography. We modeled the geography by including origin and destination dummy variables for the
continental states plus Washington D.C. For example, suppose a lane originated in California and
terminated in Texas. In this case, OCA and D_TX would both equal one. All other state dummy
variables would equal zero. Because carriers have diverse lane preferences, we expected variable
coefficients for the geography variables.
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(2) Distance. We modeled distance as a continuous variable, representing the number of miles traveled.
We expected the distance variable to have a positive coefficient since longer hauls tend to have higher
total costs.
(3) Quarters. We modeled the time of year with dummy variables for each quarter. Given the volatile
macroeconomic conditions present between 2008 and 2012, we expected diverse coefficients for the
quarter variables.
Non-core variables:
(1) Primary carrier. We modeled carrier rank by adding a dummy variable to indicate if the carrier was
the shipper's top-ranked carrier in the routing guide. The dummy variable equaled 1 when the carrier
was the top-ranked carrier in the guide; it equaled 0 in all other cases. Approximately 70 percent of
loads were accepted on the first tender by the top-ranked carrier. The remaining 30 percent of loads
were rejected by the top-ranked carrier and were subsequently accepted by a lower-ranked carrier in
the guide. We expected a negative coefficient on the carrier rank variable since top-ranked carriers
tend to have lower rates.
(2) Tender lead time. We modeled tender lead time by grouping our records into different tender lead
time brackets. A dummy variable was created for each bracket. We grouped records into the
following brackets: 0 - 12 hours, 13 - 24 hours, 1 - 3 days, 4 - 7 days, 8 - 14 days, and greater than 14
days. Less than one percent of records had lead times longer than 14 days. Because rates tend to
increase as tender lead time decreases, we expected large, positive coefficients on the short lead time
brackets.
(3) Tender day of week. We modeled tender day of week by including dummy variables for each day of
the week. We expected positive coefficients for Saturday and Sunday since it likely costs more to
tender loads outside of the business week.
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4.3 Analyzing the cost model
Our goal was to determine if a shipper's FSC program affected its line-haul rate. To answer this question,
we built four regression models with the pure FSC variable and different combinations of the other
independent variables. Table 4 summarizes the four models.
Table 4. Summary of regression models
Model Dependent variable Independent variables
1 Pure line-haul Pure FSC3.30 , geography, distance, quarters
2 Pure line-haul Pure FSC3.30 , geography, distance, quarters, primary carrier
3 Pure line-haul Pure FSC3s3o, geography, distance, quarters, tender lead time
4 Pure line-haul Pure FSC3 o30 , geography, distance, quarters, tender day of week
All four models explained the dependent variable pure line-haul and included the pure FSC variable,
evaluated at an assumed fuel price of $3.30 per gallon, and the core variables. Models 2, 3, and 4 each
contained one non-core independent variable.
After each iteration, we examined how the incremental independent variable affected the pure FSC
variable's coefficient and significance. The purpose of this step was to ensure that the sign and magnitude
of the FSC coefficient did not change by adding an incremental variable. Adding incremental non-core
variables to the primary model boosted the adjusted R2 term by less than one percent. We performed all
initial regressions on the 2008 to 2011 data, reserving the 2012 data to test model accuracy.
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4.3.1 Model 1: pure FSC, geography, distance, and quarters
The first model, which we refer to as our primary model, explained the pure line-haul dependent variable
with the independent variables pure FSC, geography, distance, and quarters. Table 5 gives the results
from this regression.
Table 5. Model 1 regression results
The second column gives the coefficient for each independent variable. In the case of the geography and
quarter variables, we reported the range of coefficients since there were too many coefficients to report in
the table. We give the complete regression output in the Appendix. Five of the geographic and quarter
dummy variables had statistically insignificant p-values greater than 0.05, however we retained these
variables for model completeness. For example, the geography dummy variable OAZ had a p-value of
0.0663, which means that there was a 6.63 percent chance of there being no real effect on pure-line haul
by O_AZ. The distance variable had a positive coefficient of 1.38. This coefficient indicates that as the
distance travelled increased by one mile, the pure line-haul charge increased by $1.38.
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Total spend FSC
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value
Intercept 950.73 15.67 <.0001
Geography (unitless)
Origin -623.22, -32.45 - -
Destination -763.01, 90.60 -
Quarter (unitless) -90.85, -11.26 - -
Distance (miles) 1.38 548.07 <.0001
PFSC3 .o3 - dist ($) -0.63 -144.5 <.0001
Fit statistics
Adjusted R2  88.99%
Mean squared error 25,672
As expected, the PFSC variable had a statistically significant negative coefficient of -0.63. This
coefficient indicates that if a shipper paid an additional dollar in fuel surcharge premium, the shipper paid
$0.63 less in pure line-haul charges. In other words, shippers that pay higher FSC premiums tend to pay
lower pure line-haul charges.
Why did this line-haul discounting phenomenon occur? Did high-FSC shippers have lower bid depths
than low-FSC shippers? As we have discussed, line-haul rates increase with bid depth. Or did carriers
adjust their line-haul bids during procurement to account for a shipper's FSC program?
Figure 15 shows the relationship between a shipper's FSC program and its percentage of first-tender
acceptances. The correlation between the average per-mile FSC premium paid and the percentage of first-
tender acceptances was a low -0.44.
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The lack of correlation between a shipper's FSC program and its bid depth performance suggests that
differences in line-haul rates were the result of carrier bidding behavior. Carriers modified their line-haul
charges according to a shipper's FSC program.
From the regression output, we know that a carrier discounts its pure line-haul charge by $0.63 for every
additional dollar spent by the shipper in fuel surcharge premiums. This does not mean that all shippers
paid the same total transportation cost, however. Because shippers have different fuel surcharge
programs, they pay different fuel surcharge premiums at different fuel prices. We define "net fuel
payment" to equal the amount the shipper pays the carrier in per-mile fuel surcharge payments minus the
per-mile pure line-haul discount extended by the carrier. Table 6 calculates the net fuel payments paid by
three hypothetical shippers with different efficiency values.
Table 6. Net fuel payment to carriers
Shipper efficiency
5 mpg 6 mpg 7 mpg
PFSC premium
$2.50 / gallon 0.50 0.42 0.36
$3.00 0.60 0.50 0.43
$3.50 0.70 0.58 0.50
$4.00 0.80 0.67 0.57
PFSC coefficient -0.63 -0.63 -0.63
PLH discount -0.42 -0.35 -0.30
Net fuel payment
$2.50 / gallon 0.08 0.07 0.06
$3.00 0.12 0.15 0.13
$3.50 0.28 0.23 0.20
$4.00 0.38 0.32 0.27
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In the table above, the per-mile pure FSC premium is calculated as follows:
fuel price
PFSC premium = e (17)
eff iciency
The pure line-haul discount, at an assumed fuel price of $3.30 per gallon, is calculated as follows:
PLH discount = PFSC coefficient x assumed fuel price (18)
efficiency
3.30 -2.079
= -. 63 x____-___
efficiency efficiency
The net fuel payment is the difference between the pure FSC premium and the pure line-haul discount.
49
Figure 16 gives the net fuel payments for these three hypothetical shippers. For fuel prices above $2.079
per gallon, the greater fuel surcharge premiums dwarfed the line-haul discount. This effect was most
pronounced among low-efficiency shippers. The shipper with the low efficiency value of five miles per
gallon paid higher net fuel payments to carriers than the shipper with the high efficiency value of seven
miles per gallon.
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Figure 16. Effect of efficiency on net fuel payment to carriers
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The tipping point of $2.079 per gallon did not change when we varied the assumed fuel price. Table 7
gives the tipping point for five different assumed fuel prices. In every case, the tipping point remains at
around $2.08 per gallon. This means that the pure line-haul discount extended by carriers is independent
of the fuel price assumed by carriers during bidding.
Table 7. PFSC coefficients at different assumed fuel prices
Assumed fuel price PFSC coefficient Tipping point
$3.00 / gallon -0.69 -2.07
3.30 -0.63 -2.08
3.50 -0.59 -2.07
4.00 -0.52 -2.08
4.50 -0.46 -2.07
4.3.2 Model 2: pure FSC, geography, distance, quarters, and primary carrier
The second model explained the pure line-haul dependent variable with the independent variables pure
FSC, geography, distance, quarters, and primary carrier. We had two forms of the primary carrier
variable: (1) a primary flag variable which equaled one when the carrier was the top-ranked carrier in the
routing guide and zero in all other cases, and (2) the primary flag variable multiplied by the distance
variable. The first variable form allowed us to calculate the per-load savings from using a primary carrier.
The second variable form allowed us to calculate the per-mile savings from using a primary carrier.
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Table 8 gives the results from the second regression.
Table 8. Model 2 regression results
(2a) Per-load (2b) Per-mile
Variable Coefficient t-stat p-val Coefficient t-stat p-val
Intercept 984.53 16.37 <.0001 973.65 16.25 <.0001
Geography (unitless)
Origin -620.53, -49.94 -629.85, -58.04
Destination -757.10, 86.98 -758.37, 84.94
Quarter (unitless) -82.75, -2.00 -83.08, -2.56
Distance (miles) 1.39 556.46 <.0001 1.44 573.04 <.0001
PFSC3 .3o ($) -0.65 -150.3 <.0001 -0.67 -155.30 <.0001
Primary flag (unitless) -45.27 -131.6 <.0001 - - -
Primary flag -dist (miles) - - - -0.07 -160.00 <.0001
Fit statistics
Adjusted R2  89.17% 89.25%
Mean squared error 25,248 25,049
In the first case, the coefficient on the primary flag variable was -45.27. This coefficient means that pure
line-haul charges were $45.27 less per load when a shipper uses its top-ranked carrier. In the second case,
the coefficient on the primary flag - distance variable was -0.07. The interpretation of this coefficient is
that the primary carrier was $0.07 cheaper per mile than lower-ranked carriers. The coefficient on the
PFSC independent variable remained statistically significant when we added both primary carrier
variables.
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4.3.3 Model 3: pure FSC, geography, distance, quarters, and tender lead time
The third model explained the pure line-haul dependent variable with the independent variables pure
FSC, geography, distance, quarters, and tender lead time. Table 9 gives the regression results for the
third regression. We left out the bracket for tender lead time greater than 14 days to prevent over-
specifying the model.
Table 9. Model 3 regression results
Variable Coefficient t-stat p-val
Intercept 918.48 15.14 <.0001
Geography (unitless)
Origin -629.66, -26.56
Destination -759.85, 96.02
Quarter (unitless) -92.06, -11.21
Distance (miles) 1.38 546.43 <.0001
PFSC3.3o - dist ($) -0.63 -143.70 <.0001
TLTo-12hrs 46.03 14.71 <.0001
TLT13 -24hrs 32.71 10.51 <.0001
TL T1 - 3 days 29.60 9.55 <.0001
TL T4 - 7 days 21.04 6.78 <.0001
TL T8 - 14 days 4.49 1.36 0.17
Fit statistics
Adjusted R2  89.01%
Mean squared error 25,609
All tender lead time variables, except the 8 - 14 day bracket, were statistically significant. Shorter lead
time brackets had larger coefficients, indicating that last-minute tenders were more expensive than tenders
scheduled in advance. The 41.54 difference between the 0 - 12 hour bracket and the 8 - 14 day bracket
indicates that a shipper paid $41.54 more on average to tender a load with less than 12 hours of lead time
as opposed to a load with between one to two weeks of lead time. A shipper can decrease its total cost by
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increasing its tender lead time. Adding the tender lead time variable did not meaningfully alter the PFSC
variable coefficient or significance.
4.3.4 Model 4: pure FSC, geography, distance, quarters, and tender day of week
The fourth model explained the pure line-haul dependent variable with the independent variables pure
FSC, geography, distance, quarters, and tender day of week. Table 10 gives the results from the fourth
regression. As in the third model, we left out one tender day to prevent over-specifying the model.
Table 10. Model 4 regression results
Variable Coefficient t-stat p-val
Intercept 874.71 14.39 <.0001
Geography (unitless)
Origin -623.23, -33.07
Destination -762.60, 90.79
Quarter (unitless) -90.15, -10.33
Distance (miles) 1.38 547.59 <.0001
PFSC3.3o -dist ($) -0.63 -144.00 <.0001
Tenderon 71.97 16.35 <.0001
Tenderues 73.73 16.75 <.0001
Tenderwed 75.88 17.24 <.0001
TenderThurs 76.54 17.39 <.0001
TenderFr 79.13 17.97 <.0001
Tendersat 107.07 23.00 <.0001
Fit statistics
Adjusted R2  89.00%
Mean squared error 25,649
All tender day variables were statistically significant. Saturday had the highest tender day coefficient. The
35.10 difference between the Saturday and Monday coefficients indicates that a shipper paid $35.10 more
on average to tender a load on Saturday than on Monday. This finding agreed with our expectation that
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shippers pay more to conduct business outside the standard work week. Adding the tender day variables
did not meaningfully alter the PFSC variable coefficient or significance.
4.4 Summary of regression results
Table 11 summarizes the regression results from the four models. All models had very similar
explanatory power, accuracy, and pure FSC coefficients.
Table 11. Summary of regression results
Model Adjusted R2  MSE PFSC coefficient
1 88.99% 25,672 -0.63
2a 89.17% 25,248 -0.65
2b 89.25% 25,049 -0.67
3 89.01% 25,609 -0.63
4 89.00% 25,649 -0.63
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4.5 Results validation
We validated our results in three ways. First, we checked the accuracy and bias of our four models. Next,
we tested our primary model on load data. Finally, we tested our primary model on 2012 data. We explain
each of these validation methods below.
4.5.1 Validating the regressions
To begin, we verified that our regression models were reasonable, accurate, and unbiased. We checked
that all variable coefficients were of the sign and magnitude that we expected. Next, we checked the mean
absolute percent error (MAPE) and the mean percent error (MPE). MAPE refers to the accuracy of the
model, and MPE refers to the bias in the model. Our primary model had a MAPE of 13 percent and a
MPE of negative two percent. These values mean that our model had 87 percent accuracy with a bias of
only two percent. MAPE and MPE values for the secondary models were similar.
Finally, we looked at the distribution of the error terms for each model. Unbiased models should have
error term distributions that are normally distributed with a mean value of zero. In all cases, our error term
distributions met this requirement.
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Figure 17 gives the distribution of error terms for the primary model.
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4.5.2 Testing the primary model on load data
In the above four models, we used tender data to generate our results. Tender data included tenders that
were both accepted and rejected by carriers. We wanted to make sure that we would get similar results if
we used only load data, which included only tenders accepted by carriers. Load data reflected the actual
transportation price paid by shippers.
When we ran the primary model using tender data, we got a coefficient of -0.63 for the pure FSC
variable. When we re-ran the primary model using load data, we got a coefficient of -0.48.The load
model had an adjusted R 2 of 89.34 percent. While the PFSC coefficient differed slightly between the two
models, the load regression results still confirm that shippers which paid higher fuel surcharge premiums
paid lower pure line-haul charges.
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4.5.3 Testing the primary model on 2012 data
Our regression models were generated using 2008 to 2011 data. We reserved 2012 data to test the
accuracy of the regression models. We predicted 2012 pure line-haul rates with the regression model
coefficients, excluding quarter variables. Next we compared the predicted 2012 values to the actual 2012
values. We checked the accuracy and bias of our predicted values.
When we ran our primary model with 2012 data, we calculated a MPE of 1.5 percent and a MAPE of 14
percent. The values indicate that our model had a very low bias of 1.5 percent and a high accuracy of 86
percent.
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4.6 Chapter summary
In this chapter, we described how we built and analyzed our transportation cost model. We also presented
and discussed our regression results.
Primary findings:
(1) Carriers implicitly discounted their line-haul rates according to a shipper's FSC program. The more a
shipper paid in FSC premiums, the more the carrier discounted the line-haul.
(2) For fuel prices above $2.079 per gallon, greater fuel surcharge premiums dwarfed the line-haul
discount. This effect was most pronounced among low-efficiency shippers.
(3) Shippers with lower efficiency values had higher per-load costs than shippers with higher efficiency
values on a given lane.
Secondary findings:
(1) Line-haul rates increased the deeper a shipper reached down its routing guide.
(2) Line-haul rates increased as tender lead time decreases.
(3) Line-haul rates were higher for weekend tenders.
These secondary findings agree with patterns observed in our dataset and with previous research done on
drivers of transportation cost.
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5 Insights and conclusion
The purpose of this research was to determine if a shipper's FSC program affected its total per-load
transportation cost. Using regression analysis, we found that carriers implicitly discounted their line-haul
rates according to a shipper's FSC program. Shippers with higher FSC premiums had lower line-haul
charges; however for fuel prices above $2.079 the larger FSC premiums overpowered the lower line-haul
charges.
5.1 Management insights
Our analysis showed that a shipper's FSC program affected its total per-load transportation cost. Shippers
with lower efficiency values paid higher per-load transportation costs than shippers with higher efficiency
values. These findings suggest that shippers can minimize their transportation costs by increasing their
efficiency values. Of course, if enough shippers switch to a high-efficiency fuel surcharge program,
carriers will likely adjust their line-haul rates so as to diminish any potential cost savings for shippers.
5.2 Future research
We ran our regression using data from 2008 to 2011. From this dataset we generated our PFSC variable
coefficient of -0.63 and our tipping point of $2.079 per gallon. Future research should test whether these
values change over time. Furthermore, in our dataset, fuel prices ranged from $2.02 per gallon to $4.76
per gallon. Within this range, we did not notice any difference in bid depth performance among shippers
with different FSC programs. Still, we might wonder if these findings hold for skyrocketing fuel prices.
Additional research is needed to evaluate whether carriers strongly prefer one type of FSC program over
another at substantially higher fuel prices. Because this research must look ahead using speculative fuel
prices, it may need to be qualitative in nature. Finally, future research could consider how a carrier
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manipulates its rates in response to a peg price change, an efficiency change, or both a peg price and
efficiency change. This information is critical for a shipper considering an adjustment to its FSC program.
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Appendix
Table 12 gives the complete regression results for the first regression model at an assumed fuel price of
$3.30 per gallon. These results correspond to the regression results in Table 5.
Table 12. Complete regression results for model 1
Variable Coefficient t-stat p-val
Intercept 950.73 15.67 <.0001
Distance 1.38 548.07 <.0001
PFSC 30  -0.63 -144.5 <.0001
O_AL -254.35 -4.20 <.0001
oAZ -111.28 -1.84 0.070
o_AR -201.95 -3.32 0.001
O_ CA -124.92 -2.06 0.040
O_ CO -497.92 -8.19 <.0001
O_CT -585.01 -9.00 <.0001
oDE -420.36 -6.90 <.0001
oDC -560.42 -6.76 <.0001
oFL -531.83 -8.77 <.0001
oGA -305.44 -5.04 <.0001
o_ D -305.21 -5.03 <.0001
oIL -110.43 -1.82 0.070
O_IN -155.48 -2.57 0.010
oIA -127.96 -2.11 0.030
O_KS -124.61 -2.05 0.040
oKY 
-230.64 -3.81 0.001
oLA -347.16 -5.73 <.0001
oME -610.00 -9.72 <.0001
oMD -522.89 -8.60 <.0001
oMA -623.22 -10.14 <.0001
O_M/
0_MN
-216.91
-32.45
-3.58
-0.54
0.001
0.590
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O_MS -245.03 -4.04 <.0001
O_MO -106.68 -1.76 0.080
OMT -125.91 -1.98 0.050
O_NE -139.94 -2.30 0.020
O_NV -173.77 -2.86 0.001
O_NH -575.77 -9.45 <.0001
O_NJ -569.81 -9.41 <.0001
O_NM -478.33 -7.56 <.0001
O_NY -473.82 -7.82 <.0001
O_NC -269.33 -4.45 <.0001
O_ND -154.60 -2.54 0.010
O_OH -208.65 -3.44 0.001
O_OK -264.18 -4.36 <.0001
O_OR -391.52 -6.46 <.0001
O_PA -482.82 -7.97 <.0001
O_RI -577.84 -8.69 <.0001
O_ SC -238.59 -3.94 <.0001
O_ SD -143.08 -2.35 0.020
O_ TN -138.15 -2.28 0.020
O_ TX -358.60 -5.92 <.0001
O_UT -425.81 -7.02 <.0001
O_ VT -574.67 -7.42 <.0001
O_ VA -407.18 -6.72 <.0001
O_ WA -438.30 -7.23 <.0001
O_WV -247.56 -4.02 <.0001
O_ W/ -54.68 -0.90 0.370
D_AL -601.62 -188.70 <.0001
D_AZ -444.17 -137.20 <.0001
D_AR -602.26 -152.20 <.0001
D_CA -763.01 -249.50 <.0001
D_CO -285.93 -86.19 <.0001
D_CT -71.27 -19.02 <.0001
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D_DE -215.40 -55.24 <.0001
D_DC -341.28 -4.26 <.0001
D_FL -158.78 -50.39 <.0001
D_GA -572.76 -178.90 <.0001
D_ID -311.43 -72.89 <.0001
D_IL -673.36 -210.00 <.0001
D_IN -688.76 -204.20 <.0001
D_IA -720.93 -225.10 <.0001
D_KS -643.20 -188.40 <.0001
D_KY -568.06 -168.80 <.0001
D_LA -479.15 -137.30 <.0001
D_ME 73.05 20.61 <.0001
D_MD -267.79 -75.22 <.0001
D_MA 8.79 2.56 0.010
D_M -574.60 -167.00 <.0001
D_MN -684.78 -210.80 <.0001
D_MS -581.72 -166.30 <.0001
D_MO -629.90 -199.20 <.0001
D_MT 90.60 16.64 <.0001
D_NE -623.52 -173.10 <.0001
D_NV -505.72 -119.60 <.0001
D_NH 15.75 3.89 0.0001
D_NJ -214.29 -66.16 <.0001
D_NM -123.81 -29.48 <.0001
D_NY -154.89 -48.13 <.0001
D_NC -522.52 -167.50 <.0001
D_ND -462.50 -99.14 <.0001
D_OH -606.95 -193.30 <.0001
D_OK -526.63 -140.20 <.0001
D_OR -363.35 -113.50 <.0001
D_PA -280.39 -89.27 <.0001
D_RI 36.93 4.97 <.0001
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D_SC -499.98 -137.70 <.0001
D_ SD -464.74 -77.15 <.0001
D_TN -591.56 -179.10 <.0001
D_ TX -428.30 -138.20 <.0001
D_UT -301.86 -93.84 <.0001
D_ VT 37.25 5.89 <.0001
D_ VA -354.38 -104.60 <.0001
D_WA -209.09 -66.08 <.0001
D_ WV -443.38 -95.68 <.0001
D_ W -700.83 -215.40 <.0001
Q1_2008 -35.58 -39.77 <.0001
Q2_2008 -29.74 -32.17 <.0001
Q3_2008 -21.10 -24.83 <.0001
Q4_2008 -11.26 -12.58 <.0001
Qi_2009 -26.71 -26.89 <.0001
Q2_2009 -60.21 -60.43 <.0001
Q3_2009 -90.85 -98.60 <.0001
Q4_2009 -89.17 -106.80 <.0001
QI_2010 -84.61 -97.72 <.0001
Q2_2010 -66.81 -78.90 <.0001
Q3_2010 -49.19 -61.96 <.0001
Q4_2010 -32.74 -41.59 <.0001
Q1_2011 -36.99 -45.52 <.0001
Q2_2011 -21.47 -26.18 <.0001
Q3_2011 -12.37 -16.10 <.0001
Fit statistics
Adjusted R2  88.99%
Mean squared error 25,672
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